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The Korean Chip Dumping Controversy: Are They
Accused of Violating an Unjust Law?
Yeomin Yoont
This Article reviews a recently decided International Trade Com-
mission antidumping case involving Korean computer chips.' Part I
reviews and analyzes the controversy. Part II points out some of the
most serious problems with the current United States antidumping
policy from a law and economics perspective. Such problems include
the inherently problematic and untrustworthy nature of determining
the average foreign market.value or the cost of production on which
the antidumping duty is based. In addition, Part II addresses the costs
of protectionist measures in U.S. antidumping policy. Part III dis-
cusses ethical and philosophical issues bearing upon U.S. antidumping
policy. It points out that using antidumping laws to restrict competi-
tion is a perversion of the law and yet such perversions are often advo-
cated in the name of the "public interest." Part III also addresses the
antidumping law from a utilitarian perspective, which is the usual
methodology used by law and economic theorists. Finally, Part IV con-
cludes not only that the legal methodology by which the Korean chip
manufacturers were found liable is deeply flawed, but that the law itself
is unjust and harms American consumers.
I. The Controversy
A. An Overview
Over the past few years, a number of South Korean industries have
been hit with antidumping actions for allegedly selling their products
in the United States at prices that are too low. Korean products alleg-
edly dumped on the U.S. market include automotive batteries, 2 ball
t Yeomin Yoon is an associate professor in the Department of Finance and Legal Stud-
ies at the W. Paul Stillman School of Business, Seton Hall University. He thanks Vivian Lugo,
John Tortora, and Eric Laffont for their research assistance. He also gratefully acknowledges
the substantial research and writing assistance, and invaluable comments, provided by Dr.
Robert W. McGee.
I DRAMs of One Megabit and Above from the Republic of Korea, USITC Pub. 2629,
Inv. No. 731-TA-556 (May 1993) (final admin. review) [hereinafter Korean DRAM Case].
2 12-Volt Lead-Acid Type Automotive Storage Batteries from the Republic of Korea,
USITC Pub. 1710, Inv. No. 731-TA-261 (June 1985) (prelim. review).
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bearings,3 brass sheet and strip,4 cast-iron pipe fittings,5 cold-rolled
carbon steel,6 color picture tubes,7 flat-rolled carbon steel,8 industrial
belts,9 motorcycle batteries, 10 nitrocellulose, 1 offshore platform jack-
ets and piles,1 2 photo albums,13 polyethylene terephthalate film, sheet
and strip, 1 4 stainless steel butt-weld pipe fittings,1 5 steel pipes and
tubes,1 6 sweaters, 17 telephone systems and subassemblies,' 8 tubular
goods,19 and welded stainless steel pipes. 20 While the number of an-
tidumping actions that have been brought against Korea in recent
3 Ball Bearings, Mounted or Unmounted, and Parts Thereof, from Argentina, Austria,
Brazil, Canada, Hong Kong, Hungary, Mexico, the People's Republic of China, Poland, the
Republic of Korea, Spain, Taiwan, Turkey and Yugoslavia, USITC Pub. 2374, Inv. Nos. 701-
TA-307, 731-TA-498 - 511 (Apr. 1991) (prelim. review).
4 Certain Brass Sheet and Strip from Brazil, Canada, and the Republic of Korea,
USITC Pub. 1930, Inv. Nos. 701-TA-269, 731-TA-311, 312, 315 (Dec. 1986) (final admin.
review).
5 Certain Cast-Iron Pipe Fittings from Brazil, the Republic of Korea, and Taiwan,
USITC Pub. 1845, Inv. Nos. 731-TA-278 - 280 (May 1986) (final admin. review), affd, Fundi-
cao Tupy S.A. v. United States, 678 F. Supp. 898 (Ct. Int'l Trade), affd, 859 F.2d 915 (Fed.
Cir. 1988).
6 Certain Cold-Rolled Carbon Steel Products from the Republic of Korea, USITC Pub.
1634, Inv. No. 701-TA-218 (Jan. 1985) (final admin. review).
7 Color Picture Tubes from Canada, Japan, the Republic of Korea, and Singapore,
USITC Pub. 2046, Inv. Nos. 731-TA-367 - 370 (Dec. 1987) (final admin. review).
8 Certain Flat-Rolled Carbon Steel Products from Argentina, Australia, Austria,
Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Korea, Mexico, the Nether-
lands, New Zealand, Poland, Romania, Spain, Sweden, Taiwan, and the United Kingdom,
USITC Pub. 2549, Inv. Nos. 701-TA-319 - 354, 731-TA-573 - 520 (Aug. 1992) (prelim. review).
9 Industrial Belts from Israel, Italy, Japan, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, the United
Kingdom, and West Germany, USITC Pub. 2194, Inv. Nos. 701-TA-293, 731-TA-412 - 419
(May 1989) (final admin. review).
10 12-Volt Motorcycle Batteries from the Republic of Korea, USITC Pub. 2203, Inv. No.
731-TA-434 (July 1989) (prelim. review).
I I Industrial Nitrocellulose from Brazil, Japan, People's Republic of China, Republic of
Korea, United Kingdom, West Germany, and Yugoslavia, USITC Pub. 2194, Inv. Nos. 731-TA-
439 - 444 (June 1990) (final admin. review).
12 Offshore Platform Jackets and Piles from the Republic of Korea and Japan, USITC
Pub. 1708, Inv. Nos. 701-TA-248, 731-TA-259 - 260 (June 1985) (prelim. review).
13 Photo Albums and Photo Album Filler Pages from Hong Kong and the Republic of
Korea, USITC Pub. 1660, Inv. Nos. 731-TA-240 -241 (Mar. 1985) (prelim. review).
14 Polyethylene Terephthalate Film, Sheet, and Strip from Korea, and Taiwan, USITC
Pub. 2292, Inv. Nos. 731-TA-458 - 460 (June 1992) (prelim. review); Polyethylene Film, Sheet,
and Strip from Japan and the Republic of Korea, USITC Pub. 2383, Inv. Nos. 731-TA-458,
731-TA459 (May 1991) (final admin. review).
15 Certain Stainless Steel Butt-Weld Pipe Fittings from Korea and Taiwan, USITC Pub.
2534, Inv. Nos. 731-TA-563 - 564 (July 1992) (prelim. review).
16 Certain Circular, Welded, Non-Alloy Steel Pipes and Tubes from Brazil, the Republic
of Korea, Mexico, Romania, Taiwan, and Venezuela, USITC Pub 2564, Inv. Nos. 731-TA-532 -
557 (Oct. 1992) (final admin. review).
17 Sweaters Wholly or in Chief Weight of Manmade Fibers from Hong Kong, the Repub-
lic of Korea, and Taiwan, USITC Pub. 2312, Inv. No. 731-TA-448-450 (Sept. 1990) (final ad-
min. review), USITC Pub. 2577, Inv. No. 731-TA-448-450 (Nov. 1992) (on remand).
18 Certain Telephone Systems and Subassemblies Thereof from Korea, USITC Pub.
2554, Inv. No. 731-TA-427 (Jan. 1990) (final admin. review).
19 Oil Country Tubular Goods from Brazil, Korea, and Spain, USITC Pub. 1633, Inv.
Nos. 701-TA-215 - 217 (Jan. 1985) (final admin. review).
20 Certain Welded Stainless Steel Pipes from the Republic of Korea and Taiwan, USITC
Pub. 2585, Inv. Nos. 731-TA-540 - 541 (Dec. 1992) (final admin. review).
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years is cause for concern, this paper will focus on one antidumping
action involving computer chips, DRAMs of One Megabit and Above from
the Republic of Korea21
B. Facts of the Case
By -1992, Korean competitors of Micron Technology, Inc. (Mi-
cron), of Boise, Idaho, represented twenty-eight percent of the U.S.
market for dynamic random access memory computer chips
(DRAMs).22 In an attempt to prevent further loss of U.S. market
shares, in April 1992, Micron filed a petition with the U.S. Commerce
Department asking it to rule that these competitors were selling their
chips in the U.S. market for less than fair value, and to assess appropri-
ate tariffs.23 Micron proceeded under the Tariff Act of 1930.24
21 Korean Dram Case, USITC Pub. 2519, Inv. No. 731-TA-556 (June 1992) (prelim.
review).
22 U.S. companies bought $800 million worth of Korean chips in 1992. See Robert
Keatley, U.S. Duties on Korean Semiconductors Raise Double-Edged Sword to Dumping, WALL ST. J.,
Feb. 19, 1993, at A1O.
23 Korean DRAM Case, USITC Pub. 2519, at B-4, Inv. No. 731-TA-556 (June 1992) (pre-
lim. review). Micron accused three Korean producers-Samsung Electronics Co., Goldstar
Electronic Co., and Hyundai Electronic Industries-of selling below their cost of production.
Id. Selling below the cost of production is a generally accepted reason for filing an an-
tidumping suit. See, e.g., Geoff Crane, Micron Technologies' Dram Dunk, Kota.A ECON. REP.,
June 1992, at 49. The items covered by this petition included processed wafers, uncut die,
cut die, and assembled I Meg and above DRAMs produced in Korea and imported directly or
indirectly into the United States; processed wafers produced in Korea and further processed
into finished or semi-finished 1 Meg and above DRAMs in a third country before exportation
to the United States; and finished or semi-finished DRAMs assembled in Korea from wafers
produced in another country. 57 Fed. Reg. 18,163 (1992). The scope of this petition in-
cluded memory modules, such as Single In-Line Processing Modules (SIPs) and Single In-
Line Memory Modules (SIMMs), containing more than I Meg or above DRAMs mounted on
their own small printed circuit board; memory cards, which are memory modules about the
size of a credit card designed to be easily inserted into portable computers, printers, and
similar hardware; video random access memory (VRAM), which is DRAM designed to im-
prove the video performance of computers; and any future packaging and assembling of
DRAMs. Id.
24 Antidumping laws have been on the books in the United Statesfor many decades.
The first antidumping law was the Antidumping Duty Act of 1916, codified at 15 U.S.C. § 72
(1992). Because this Act was a criminal statute and had an intent requirement, it was difficult
to convict anyone of dumping. Thus, it was necessary to enact another antidumping law, civil
in nature, that would lower the level of proof needed for liability. The Antidumping Act of
1921 was passed for this purpose. See Antidumping Act of 1921, Pub. L. No. 67-19, 42 Star.
11, codified at 19 U.S.C. §§ 160-171 (repealed 1980). The Antidumping Act of 1921 estab-
lished the sanction of an offsetting duty against imported products dumped in the U.S. mar-
ket. This Act also established a two-pronged legal process, still used today, by which one
government agency (originally the Treasury Department but now the Commerce Depart-
ment) determined whether a product was being dumped and another government agency
(originally the Tariff Commission but now the International Trade Commission) determined
whether the dumping caused injury. See Michael S. Knoll, United States Antidumping Law: The
Case for Reconsideration, 22 TEX INr'L L.J. 265, 268 (1987). Most provisions of the Antidump-
ing Act of 1921 were later merged into the. Tariff Act of 1930. See S. REP. No. 249, 96th
Cong., 1st Sess. 1, 60-61 (1979), reprinted in 1979 U.S.C.C.A.N. 341, 446-47.
Under the current law concerning antidumping proceedings, the Commerce Depart-
ment is required to make a preliminary determination within 160 days from the time the
petition is filed and a final determination 235 days from the time the petition is filed. 19
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As a result of Micron's petition, the Commerce Department found
sales below fair value and assessed final weighted average margins as
follows: Goldstar, 4.97%; Hyundai, 11.45%; Samsung, 0.82%; others,
3.89%.25 Some expect the move to save four thousand jobs in the
American chip industry.2 6
II. Legal and Economic Problems and Costs of U.S. Antidumping
Policy
A. The Problems
1. Determining "U.S. Price" and "Foreign Market Value"
Determinations of dumping are found when sales of the foreign
product are made at less than fair value (LTFV), which occurs when
the foreign market value of the product is more than the product's
U.S. price.2 7 In the Korean DRAM Case Micron calculated the U.S.
price based on observed price quotes of DRAMs by U.S. distributors,
making deductions for the distributors' markups and movement ex-
penses.2 8 Foreign market value (or fair market value) can be deter-
mined based upon home market price, constructed value, or third
country prices.2 9 Micron demonstrated home market price by using:
U.S.C. § 1673b (1980 & Supp. 1992). The Commerce Department may extend a preliminary
antidumping determination for 50 days and the final determination for 60 days, under cer-
tain circumstances. Id. On the other hand, the final determination by the International
Trade Commission may be made as late as 420 days after the petition is filed. See U.S. INTER-
NATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION, SUMMARY OF STATUTORY PROVISIONS RELATED TO IMPORT RELIEF
8-16 (no date).
25 Korean DRAM Case, USITC Pub. 2629, Inv. Nos. 731-TA-556 (May 1993) (final ad-
min. review). The final margins were erroneously reported in 58 Fed. Reg. 15,481 (1993).
The European Community Commission has also charged Korean DRAM manufacturers
with dumping. The EC assessed them with a 10.1% tariff. The small penalty is seen by some
people in the industry as sending a message to the Koreans that the EC does not want to
derail Korean advances against the Japanese, who dominate the market. See Naomi Freund-
lich, The Korean Semiconductor Boom Boomerangs, Bus. WK., Oct. 5, 1992, at 107. In the 1 Meg
DRAM segment of the market, one Korean company, Samsung, supplies about half of Eu-
rope's needs. Samsung and the other Korean companies are able to undercut the competi-
tion in Europe by between 18% and 120%. See EC Sets Korean DRAM Duty, Floppy Probe,
ELECTRONIC NEWS, Sept. 21, 1992, at 1, 4. The European complaint was filed on behalf of
Siemens AG, SGS-Thomson Microelectronics, and Motorola's U.K. unit, all of which stand to
lose business if the Korean companies keep their prices low. Id at 4. One day after the
Commission imposed the 10.1% antidumping tariff, the Korean Trade and Industry Ministry
(MTI) made an attempt to appease the Commission by introducing a check price system on
the three Korean chip manufacturers. Kim Nak-Hieon, EC Slaps Tax on Korean DRAMs, ELEC-
TRONICS, Sept. 28, 1992, at 3. In March, 1993, the EC and the Korean DRAM producers
entered into an agreement to set minimum floor prices for exports to the European Commu-
nity for five years. See, e.g., Korean DRAM Case, USITC 2629, Inv. No. 731-TA-556 (May 1993)
(final admin. review).
26 Keatley, supra note 22.
27 See 57 Fed. Reg. 21,231 (1992); 58 Fed. Reg. 15,468-15,470 (1993); see also ICC Indus.,
Inc. v. United States, 812 F.2d 694, 697 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
28 See, e.g., Korean DRAM Case, USITC Pub. 2519, Inv. No. 731-TA-556 (June 1992)
(prelim. review).
29 Sweaters Wholly or in Chief Weight of Manmade Fibers from Hong Kong, The Re-
KoREAN CHIP DUMPING
(1) average home market prices it obtained from Dataquest,30 and (2)
company-specific home market price quotes it received from an un-
identified company.5 1 Micron also calculated the cost of production,
i.e., constructed value, of one and four megabit DRAMs for each Ko-
rean manufacturer.5 2 Micron's computations included an assumed
eight percent profit. 33
Micron argued that because the chips were being sold for less
than the calculated cost of production, home market sales and third
country sales were an inadequate basis for computing the foreign mar-
ket value. Micron thus argued that the foreign market value should be
set at cost of production.3 4 Because the three Korean competitors de-
fending the antidumping charge did not report to the Commerce De-
partment all the financial data needed to make accurate cost of
production computations, Micron's cost of production calculation was
accepted under the "best available information at the time" rule. 35
Hence, Micron's computation of the cost of production was used as
the foreign market value.
Cost of production calculations are, however, inherently problem-
atic and are not necessarily trustworthy. First, differences in U.S. and
Korean accounting methods pose problems. In Korea, companies are
allowed a great deal of flexibility in spreading costs such as deprecia-
tion and research and development over several years. In the United
States, companies must abide by strict depreciation schedules and
claim other costs in the fiscal year during which the money is actually
spent. Applying U.S. accounting standards could significantly raise Ko-
rean costs of production as defined by the Commerce Department.36
A larger problem is simply determining which costs apply to which
products. Korean manufacturers invested $1.7 billion in new produc-
tion equipment over the last three years. But some of that equipment
is used for research and development and other semiconductor de-
vices as well as for DRAMs. The technical rules for calculating costs
lead to many arbitrary allocations. 37
public of Korea, and Taiwan, USITC Pub. 2312, Inv. Nos. 731-TA-448 - 450 (Sept. 1990) (final
admin. review).
30 Dataquest is a California-based company that provides information services for the
computer industry.
31 Korean DRAM Case, USITC Pub. 2519, Inv. No. 731-TA-556 (June 1992) (prelim.
review).
32 Jd
33 57 Fed. Reg. 21,232 (1992). An 8% profit margin assumption is permitted under the
current antidumping policy. Such an assumption is unrealistic. Industry sources doubt that
any maker, Japanese and U.S. included, is making an 8% profit off current prices for the 1
megabit or eyen the 4 megabit DRAM. See Crane, supra note 23, at 50.
34d.
35 See Plastic Animal Identification Tags from New Zealand, USITC Pub. 1094, Inv. No.
303-TA-14 (Sept. 1980) for an example of the application of the "best available information
at the time" rule.
36 See Crane, supra note 23, at 50.
37 Id.
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Second, the drop in the world market price of 1 Meg DRAMs from
$26.00 to about $3.20 between 1988 and the time the antidumping
action was filed in the first quarter of 199238 further complicates the
computations. s9
2. Using Average Foreign Market Value
The use of an average foreign market value to determine whether
dumping has occurred is analytically improper because it compares
the foreign market value, usually the average foreign price, to an indi-
vidual U.S. sale price, rather than comparing the average foreign price
to the average domestic price. The Commerce Department can com-
pute a dumping margin if the foreign company sells any units in the
U.S. market for less than the average foreign price for the period be-
ing investigated. 40 Thus, if the foreign company charges a reasonable
range of prices that includes the U.S. price over some relevant period
of time, which is usually the case, it is possible that about half of the
prices will be below the U.S. price and half will be above the U.S. price,
resulting in fifty percent of the U.S. sales qualifying for a dumping
margin.
The Korean DRAM Case is an excellent example of this analytically
irrational comparison. One hundred comparisons were made between
the prices Korean companies charged and the prices U.S. companies
charged. In forty-seven cases, the Korean companies undersold the
U.S. company by between 0.1% and 28.0%. In forty-eight cases, the
Korean product had a higher price than the U.S. product by 0.3% to
69.2%. In the other five cases, the prices of the Korean and U.S. chips
were identical. 41 Overall, it would appear that the Koreans are not
dumping at all, but are merely being competitive. In nearly half of the
cases, the Korean price was actually more than the domestic company's
38 Id.
39 Chip prices have been volatile. Prices more than quadrupled in the late 1980s and
dropped dramatically to become the cheapest ever in the early 1990s. In the first half of
1993, a 4 megabit chip sold for $10.50 to $11.00 in the spot market. By early August of 1993,
the price had jumped to about $20.00. Part of this price rise is attributable to a fire at the
Sumitomo plant in Japan. Sumitomo provides about 60% of the world supply of a certain
kind of epoxy, a glue that is used in chip packaging. See Peter H. Lewis, Memoly Chip Prices
Take the Up Stairs Again, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 15, 1993, at 12F.
Another issue concerning price drops is cause and effect. As the dissenting opinion in
the Korean DRAM Case pointed out:
The fact that prices for domestic DRAMs decreased during the period of inves-
tigation tells us nothing about whether the subject imports caused price depres-
sion or suppression.... DRAM prices decline as more firms progress along a
learning curve, and so in the later stages of the product life cycle, as more firms
move down the curve, DRAM prices will fall regardless of unfair trade practices.
Later entrants will receive lower prices. These market forces, combined with
the other factors discussed in this opinion, lead us to conclude that the price
depression or suppression, if any, caused by subject imports is not significant.
USITC 2629, 48-49, Inv. No. 731-TA-556 (May 1993) (final admin. review).
40 JAMEs BovARD, THE FAIR TRADE FRAUD 120-21 (1991).
41 Korean DRAM Case, USITC 2519, Inv. No. 731-TA-556 (June 1992) (prelim. review).
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price. 42
The General Accounting Office has criticized the practice of using
average prices because of the tendency to increase existing dumping
margins or create dumping margins where none previously existed.43
The Court of International Trade has stated that this method of price
comparison is not reasonably fair.44 In a 1989 case, the court stated:
When Congress amended the 1979 provision to authorize Com-
merce under section 1677f-1 to average both U.S. price and foreign
market value in making comparisons, Congress did not direct Com-
merce to apply a stricter set of prerequisites when ascertaining the
U.S. price. Legislative history discloses that by extending the use of
averaging with respect to the U.S. price, the lawmakers wanted to "ex-
pand the instances in which the administering authority may use sam-
pling and averaging techniques." . . . Despite this, it appears that
Commerce almost universally averages only the foreign market value.
The Court questions whether the impact of Commerce's current aver-
aging policy relieves administrative burden to the extent that it leads
to "loss of reasonable fairness in the results." 45
3. Computing the Antidumping Tariff
In computations of the antidumping tariff, there is a built-in bias
against foreign companies. 46 When the U.S. price is more than the
average foreign price, the Commerce Department assigns a "less than
fair value" amount of zero, as if the average foreign price were equal to
the U.S. price.4 7 Conversely, if the U.S. price is less than the average
foreign price, the Commerce Department assigns a positive LTFV
equal to the amount the foreign market price exceeds the U.S. price. 48
By calculating the average LTFV, the Commerce Department arrives at
the antidumping tariff.49
To illustrate, if it is determined that the average foreign price is
42 The dissenting opinion in the final determination raised another point:
Although the underselling/overselling comparisons are almost evenly split, we
do not place much weight on evidence of underselling.... [T] he confluence of
demand for memory and the point in the product life cycle largely explain the
price of DRAMs at any particular point in time. As a result of these market
forces, price comparisons are only meaningful if they are contemporaneous,
i.e., at the same point in the DRAM product life cycle. In this investigation, the
price comparisons between domestic DRAMs and subject imports are not con-
temporaneous. Accordingly, the price comparisons do not constitute substan-
tial evidence that any underselling is significant.
Korean DRAM Case, USITC 2629, 49, Inv. No. 731-TA-556 (May 1993) (final admin. review).
43 See BOvARD, supra note 40, at 122, 163 n.59 (ciuing U.S. GENERAL AccOurTING OFFICE.
U.S. ADMINISTRATION OF THE ANTIDUMPING Acr OF 1921, Mar. 15, 1979, at 21).
44 NAR, S.p.A. v. United States, 13 Ct. Int'l Trade 82, 88 (1989).
45 Id. (quoting H.R. REP. No. 725, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 45-46 (1984), reprinted in 1984
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5127, 5172-73 (1984)).
46 See Knoll, supra note 24, at 278.
47 See, e.g., Serampore Indus. Pvt. Ltd. v. United States Dep't of Commerce, 675 F. Supp.
1354, 1360 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1987).
48 See, e.g., Carlisle Tire and Rubber Co. v. United States, 622 F. Supp. 1017, 1073 (Ct.
Int'l Trade 1985).
49 See, e.g., id.
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ten dollars and the foreign supplier sells the product for twelve dollars
in the U.S., then the sale is considered to be made at ten dollars. But if
the sale is at eight dollars, then the sale is considered to be made at
eight dollars. So if half the sales are made at eight dollars, with a LTFV
of two dollars, and half are made at twelve dollars, with an LTFV of
zero, then the LTFV margin will be ten percent.50
4. Applying the Exchange Rate Retroactively
Changes in the exchange rates can cause a company to be guilty
of dumping through no fault of its own-retroactively. 51 In order to
compare foreign and domestic prices, it is necessary to convert to a
common currency. It is impossible, however, for foreign manufactur-
ers to predict exchange rates in advance, as exchange rates constantly
fluctuate. Nevertheless, it is the Commerce Department's view that ex-
change rates can be applied retroactively, thereby creating cases of
dumping where none previously existed and making determination of
safe prices by foreign manufacturers impossible. 52 Hence, if exchange
rates shift in the wrong direction, a foreign seller can be found guilty
of dumping even if there was no intent to dump. Furthermore, manu-
facturers importing into the United States from countries experienc-
ing hyperinflation can be severely penalized by the Commerce
Department's methodology. 53
B. The Costs
1. Monetary Costs
Dataquest has estimated that the computer industry in the United
States will have to pay ten to fifteen percent more for computer chips
as a result of the ruling in the Korean DRAM Case.54 They will have to
50 The LTFV margin = ($2 x 0.5 + $0 x 0.5)/$10 = 0.1 or 10%. The final LTFV margins
as found by the Commerce Department are: Goldstar, 4.97%; Hyundai, 11.45%; Samsung,
0.82%; and all other manufacturers, 3.89%. See Korean DRAM Case, USITC Pub. 2629, 1-1,
Inv. No. 731-TA-556 (May 1993).
51 Commerce Department regulations provide that the rate used in foreign currency
conversions is the rate in effect on the date of the sale. 19 C.F.R. §§ 353.46, 353.49, 353.50,
353.60 (1993). Because different rates were probably in effect throughout the production of
the goods at issue, the application of a rate determined at a later date can distort the out-
come of the investigation.
52 For more on this point, seeN. David Palmeter, Exchange Rates and AntidumpingDetermi-
nations, 22J. WORLD TRADE, Apr. 1988, at 73.
53 Some commentators have suggested that the Commerce Department use a different
methodology in cases involving a hyperinflationary currency. See Gilbert B. Kaplan et al., Cost
Analysis under the Antidumping Law, 21 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 357, 409-10 (1988). It
should also be noted that a decision by the Federal Reserve Board to drive down the value of
the dollar in comparison to other currencies can trigger antidumping margins where none
previously existed. This means, in effect, that the Commerce Department is delegating ex-
change rate determination to the Federal Reserve Bank which, nominally, at least, is a private
organization. Is such delegation constitutional? N. David Palmeter mentions this point in
Exchange Rates and Antidumping Determinations, supra note 52, at 75.
54 DRAM Dumping: A Sudden Blockade?, KoREA ECON. REP., Dec. 1992, at 27.
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either pass on this cost to consumers, if they can, or absorb the extra
cost in their profit margins.
Comparing antidumping laws to protectionist policies supports
this proposition. Studies on protectionism are consistent in their find-
ings that there is a deadweight loss as a result of protectionist policies,
and that the losses consistently outweigh the gains. For example, a
Brookings Institution study found that voluntary export restraints
placed on cars cost consumers approximately $14 billion in 1984.55
Domestic automobile manufacturers gained only $9 billion as a result
of the restraints, which means the deadweight loss was $5 billion dol-
lars.56 Another study estimated the loss from a certain auto quota ar-
rangement to be between $200 million and $1.2 billion.57 Studies of
protectionism in steel,58 textiles,59 and agricultural products 60 also
conclude that protectionism has a net cost rather than benefit.
In the present case, companies that use products containing com-
puter chips will be hurt by the action because they must pay more for
computer products, which will either reduce their profit margins or
force them to raise prices, which will adversely affect their customers.
It will also make a wide range of U.S. industries less competitive be-
cause of their increased cost structure.
The antidumping action is also expected to have an adverse effect
on the trade balance.6 ' Interestingly, the Korean semiconductor in-
dustry specializes in memory chips, whereas the U.S. industry focuses
on non-memory chips. 62 The two segments of the industry comple-
ment each other. Until the early 1990s, Korea had been importing
about $600 million worth of U.S. chips each year, and U.S. companies
55 Clifford Wilson and Assoc., Blind Intersection? Policy and the Automobile Indusy 65-66
(1987), summarized in Thomas D. Hopkins, Cost of Regulation, ROCHESTER INSTITUTE OF TECH-.
NOLOGY WORKING PAPER B8-9 (December 1991).
56 Id.
57 Jaime de Melo & David Tarr, Welfare Costs of US. Quotas in Textiles, Steel and Autos, 72
REv. EcoN. & STAT. 489, 489-97 (1990).
58 C. FRED BERGSTEN ET AL., AUCTION QUOTAS AND UNITED STATES TRADE POLICY 42
(1987); GARY CLYDE HUFBAUER ET AL., TRADE PROTECTION IN THE UNITED STATES: 31 CASE
STUDIES 178-79 (1986); Robert C. Feenstra, How Costly is Protectionism?, 6J. ECON. PERSPEC-
TW-S 159-78 (1992); Susan Hickok, The Consumer Cost of U.S. Trade Restraints, 10 QTR. REv. 1,8
(Summer 1985), Federal Reserve Bank of New York; Janet Novack, Does Big Steel Really Need
Protection?, FORBES, March 16, 1992, at 37.
59 Wit-Lm R. CLINE, THE FUTURE OF WORLD TRADE IN TEXTILES AND APPAREL 14-16 (re-
vised ed., 1990); HUFBAUER ET AL., supra note 58, at 146-48; Hickok, supra note 58, at 6, 18-19;
Irene Trela and John Whalley, Global Effects of Developed Country Trade Restrictions on Trade and
Apparel, 100 ECON. J. 1190, 1190-1205 (1990); Melo, supra note 57, at 493.
60 Bruce L. Gardner, The United States, in AGRICULTURAL PROTECTIONISM IN THE INDUSTRI-
ALIZED WORLD 52 (Fred H. Sanderson ed., 1990); CLIFrON B. LUTrrELL, THE HIGH COST OF
FARM WELFARE 121-22 (1989);James E. Anderson, The Relative Inefficiency of Quotas: The Cheese
Case, 75 A. ECON. REv. 178, 178-90 (1985); Feenstra, supra note 58, at 163.
61 Note that it has been argued that the trade balance is an irrelevant statistic. For an
exposition of this view, see Robert W. McGee, Trade Deficits and Economic Policy: A Law and
Economics Analysis, 11 J.L. & CoM. 159, 159-74 (1992).
62 DRAM Dumping: A Sudden Blockade?, supra note 54.
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had been buying about $700 million a year in Korean-made chips. 63 In
addition, Korean chipmakers were importing about $600 million a
year in semiconductor manufacturing equipment from American sup-
pliers and paying about $200 million in royalties for the semiconduc-
tor technologies imported from the United States.64 Reducing Korean
chip imports could result in reducing the income that American-based
semiconductor companies receive.65 Besides, the current dumping
ruling will discourage Korean chipmakers who are trying to shift im-
ports of manufacturing equipment and materials from Japan to the
United States.66 Currently, Korean semiconductor firms are heavily re-
lying on Japanese suppliers.67
Finally, note that the Japanese, who already have fifty-three per-
cent of the U.S. market for DRAM chips, 68 appear to gain the most,
since the Koreans now have one hand tied behind their back.69 The
Japanese will be able to raise their prices and still sell their chips for
less than the Koreans, who must now contend with the antidumping
tariffs. 70 Furthermore, Micron and other U.S. chip producers will also
be able to raise their prices.
2. Nonmonetary Costs
The Commerce Department's action against the Korean DRAM
producers was estimated to save 4,000 U.S. jobs.71 However, that is
only part of the story. If DRAM chips cost more as a result of the an-
tidumping action, then U.S. companies that use DRAM chips will have
to either pass on this added cost to their customers or absorb the cost
and take a reduced profit on whatever they sell. If they pass on the
added cost, it is likely that they will sell fewer units of their product. It
63 Id.
64 Id.
65 Id.
66 Id.
67 Id.
68 Keatley', supra note 22. The Japanese also have a dominant position in other seg-
ments of the computer and electronics market. However, it should be remembered that the
leader of today is not necessarily the leader of tomorrow. For example, in the flat-panel
display segment of the industry, Japan now has a near monopoly, but that monopoly is being
strongly challenged by the Dutch. See Richard L. Hudson, Philips Refits Dutch Plant in Bold
Plan to Unseat Rivals, WALL ST. J., July 28, 1993, at B4.
69 In 1988, the Japanese controlled an estimated 90% of the DRAM market in the
United States. The Secret of Success, KoREA ECON. REP., June 1992, at 51. Since then, the Ko-
rean chip manufacturers have eaten into this near monopoly, to the benefit of both the U.S.
companies that use chips and the consumers who buy products containing chips. Yet the
Koreans are being penalized for helping to keep the cost of chips down. American consum-
ers are being penalized as well, because they must now pay higher prices for chips and prod-
ucts made with chips.
70 American companies that use the Korean chips say that the Korean chips are as good
as or better than the Japanese chips, and that the service the Korean companies provide is
also quite good. Id. Thus, U.S. companies that use Korean chips might likely have to choose
between incurring the added expense due to the antidumping duty or sacrificing quality.
71 Keatley, supra note 22.
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is a basic principle of economics that if you raise the price, you will sell
fewer units. 72 Thus, the companies that use DRAM chips may have to
cut back production, or at least not expand it as fast as would otherwise
be the case if the chip prices were not artificially raised as a result of
the increased duties. The same thing happens if the DRAM chip users
absorb the added cost into their bottom lines. With reduced profit
margins, they cannot raise as much capital, which would otherwise be
available for expansion, so their growth rate is reduced. They will not
be able to hire as many employees because they will not grow as fast as
would otherwise be the case. The net effect, then, of the antidumping
action is arguably to retard the growth of U.S. companies that use
DRAM chips, which are a significant part of the cost of the final prod-
uct.7 3 The move also makes these U.S. companies less competitive, be-
cause foreign companies will be better able to compete against the
U.S. companies once the U.S. companies have an increased cost of
production. Thus, the Commerce Department's attempt to help U.S.
DRAM chipmakers is at least partially offset by the harm the antidump-
ing action causes to U.S. companies that use DRAM chips. The ques-
tion is, will the Commerce Department's action do more harm than
good?
The gains and losses are difficult to predict. However, one U.S.
company, AST Research, Inc., of Irvine, California, adversely affected
by the present antidumping action, estimates that it could cost them
700 jobs.74 AST makes computers using Korean and other DRAM
chips.7 5 Besides having to pay more for DRAM chips generally, 76 AST
and similar companies that use imported subassemblies containing Ko-
rean chips must also pay the extra duties.7 7 AST and other companies
thus have a greater incentive to ship more manufacturing overseas in
order to keep the cost of their computers low. Although apparently
no studies have been made on the number ofjobs that would be lost or
gained by imposing an antidumping duty on Korean chip manufactur-
ers, it is reasonable to expect that there would be a deadweight job
loss, given that the studies measuring gains and losses in other indus-
tries with protectionist policies consistently find that job losses exceed
job gains.78
One study of a particular trade restraint in the apparel industry
72 PAUL A. SAMUELSON, ECONOMICS 60 (9th ed. 1973).
73 The Secret of Success, supra note 69, at 51.
74 Keatley, supra note 22. AST is only one of many DRAM users that stand to be ad-
versely affected by the tariff. Id. It should be pointed out that AST's suppliers will also be
harmed if AST moves jobs to other countries.
75 Keatley, supra note 22.
76 Not only would U.S. companies have to pay more for Korean DRAM chips because of
the antidumping duty, but the fact that Korean chips cost more makes it easier for other
DRAM chip producers to raise their prices, as the Koreans are no longer as competitive.
77 Keatley, supra note 22.
78 See infra notes 79-82 and accompanying text.
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estimated that the policy, if implemented, would save 36,000 apparel
manufacturing jobs but destroy 58,000jobs in the apparel retailing in-
dustry, for a net loss/gain ratio of more than 1.6 to 1.79 A study of the
1984 voluntary restraints in the steel industry estimated that 17,000
jobs would be saved in the steel industry but 52,000jobs would be de-
stroyed in the industries that use steel, for a loss/gain ratio of 3.1 to
1.80 Another study of steel import restraints estimated that a particular
policy would save approximately 27,000 jobs and destroy approxi-
mately 41,000 other jobs, a ratio of slightly more than 1.5 to 1.81 A
study of the proposed fifteen percent import quota in the steel indus-
try estimated jobs saved in the steel industry at 26,000 and jobs de-
stroyed in the steel-using industries at 93,000, a loss/gain ratio of 3.6 to
1.82
3. Other Costs
While often overlooked by economists and others, there are other
costs associated with the adoption of a protectionist policy. One such
cost might be called "social harmony" cost. Protectionist measures pit
producers against consumers. And it is the producers that wield the
most power. They are a concentrated group and they have the ear of
the legislature whereas consumers are dispersed and relatively power-
less. What results is resentment on the part of consumers. Legislators
are then caught between two colliding groups: consumers and produ-
cers. Protectionism serves to perpetuate and heighten this conflict.
Another cost of protectionist policies is reduced choice. In the
case of cars, for example, a quota policy makes it impossible for all
consumers to buy the foreign car of their choice because the govern-
ment will not allow the foreign manufacturer to ship the car into the
country. And if the protectionist policy takes the form of a tariff rather
than a quota, the effect is basically the same, since the increased price
resulting from the tariff will price some consumers out of the market.
In the case of computer chips, a dumping duty acts much like a tariff,
since it raises the price of foreign-produced chips. But antidumping
penalties can also prohibit foreign producers from sending their chips
79 LAURA M. BAUGHMAN & THOMAS EMRICH, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS AND ECONOMIC RE-
SEARCH CORP., ANALYSIS OF THE IMPACT OF THE TEXTILE AND APPAREL TRADE ENFORCEMENT ACT
OF 1985, June 1985, tbl. 4, cited in I.M. DESTLER AND JOHN S. ODELL, ANTI-PROTECTION:
CHANGING FORCES IN UNITED STATES TRADE POLITICS 54 n.40, 56 n.43 (1987). This 1.6 to I
ratio is conservative because it does not measure the secondary effects, i.e., the job losses that
would occur in other industries as a result of implementing the policy. But the policy would
have a ripple effect throughout the economy, affecting many industries indirectly and
adversely.
80 ARTHUR DENZAU, CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF AMERICAN BUSINESS, How IMPORT RE-
STRANTS REDUCE EMPLOYMENT 12 (1987).
81 Jose A. Mendez, The Short-Run Trade and Employment Effects of Steel Import Restraints, 20
J. WORLD TRADE L. 554, 564 (1986).
82 See ARTHUR T. DENZAU, CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF AMERICAN BUSINESS, AMERICAN
STEEL: RESPONDING TO FOREIGN COMPETITION 16-17 (1985).
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across the border, which has the effect of a quota. Either way, domes-
tic consumers of computer chips have reduced choice as a result of
antidumping policy.
III. Ethical and Philosophical Issues Concerning U.S. Antidumping
Policy
A. Unethical Use of the Antidumping Laws to Restrict Competition
Domestic companies that are feeling the pressure of competition
may abuse the antidumping laws by using them to restrict competition
at the expense of consumers and the general public. Micron, for ex-
ample, may have been so motivated when it used the antidumping laws
once before, in 1985, to pressure Japanese manufacturers of 64 kilobit
DRAMs to raise their prices.83
Using antidumping laws to restrict competition is a perversion of
the law. Yet such perversions are often advocated in the name of pro-
tecting consumers. In effect, companies that bring antidumping ac-
tions are using the law to batter the competition, because enforcement
of such laws makes it more difficult for foreign companies to compete,
to the detriment of consumers. Such rent-seeking behavior8 4 is likely
to appear whenever the costs are low and the potential returns are
high, which is the case with antidumping laws: All that a domestic pro-
ducer need do to initiate an investigation is to write a letter to the
Commerce Department to complain about some foreign producer
dumping its products on the domestic market.8 5 The Commerce De-
partment (i.e., the American taxpayers) will pick up the costs of the
investigation from there. The complaining company incurs practically
no further expense, although the accused company might have to in-
cur millions of dollars of legal and administrative expenses to satisfy
the Commerce Department that no dumping has occurred. Causing
companies to incur such costs to defend against frivolous charges is
unethical because it deprives that company's shareholders of a portion
of their wealth, i.e., dividends or shareholder equity. Furthermore,
83 64K Dynamic Random Access Memory Components from Japan, USITC Pub. 1862,
Inv. No. 731-TA-270 (June 1986) (final admin. review).
84 Rent-seeking behavior may be loosely defined as seeking special privileges or protec-
tion from government or getting someone else to pay for your benefits. See generally THE
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF RENT-SEEKING (Charles K. Rowley et al. eds., 1988) (discussing the
economic theory of rent-seeking and policy); TOWARDS A THEORY OF THE RENT-SEEKING SoCI-
ETY (James M. Buchanan et al. eds., 1980) (discussing the economic theory of rent-seeking);
GORDON TULLOCK, THE ECONOMICS OF SPECIAL PRIVILEGE AND RENT-SEEKING (1989) (discuss-
ing the economic theory of rent-seeking and social choice).
85 The government does not initiate many antidumping investigations. Only seven of
the many hundreds of antidumping investigations initiated between 1979 and 1990 were ini-
tiated by the government: six of these involved the trigger price mechanism for steel; the
other one was for semiconductors. For a listing of the antidumping cases between 1979 and
1990, see I.M. DESTLER, AMERICAN TRADE PoTics 326 app. C (1992).
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taxpayers finance any and all of these antidumping investigations,
none of which lead to consumer benefits.
A few years ago, two economists wrote an article explaining how
this abuse works.86 Although their article concerned abuse of the anti-
trust laws, the same could easily be said of antidumping laws. To illus-
trate this point, just substitute "antidumping" for "antitrust" in the
following quote:
There is a specter that haunts our antitrust institutions. Its threat is
that, far from serving as the bulwark of competition, these institutions
will become the most powerful instrument in the hands of those who
wish to subvert it. More than that, it threatens to draw great quantities
of resources into the struggle to prevent effective competition, thereby
more than offsetting the contributions to economic efficiency prom-
ised by antitrust activities. This is a specter that may well dwarf any
other source of concern about the antitrust processes. We ignore it at
our peril and would do well to take steps to exorcise it.
87
B. Philosophical Issues: The Illusionary Foundation of Antidumping
Policy
1. The Concept of Harm
The legal standard in antidumping investigations requires the In-
ternational Trade Commission (ITC) to determine whether there is a
reasonable indication of material injury or a threat of material injury
to a domestic industry because of the imported items, based on the
best available information at the time of the determination. 88 Theoret-
ically, any domestic company can be injured whenever a foreign com-
pany makes a sale that the domestic company would otherwise make. 89
So, in theory at least, there is a plausible case whenever any foreign
86 See generally WilliamJ. Baumol andJanusz A. Ordover, Use ofAntitrust to Subvert Compe-
tition, 28 J.L. & EcON. 247 (1985) (discussing abuse of antitrust laws).
87 Id. at 247.
88 See 19 U.S.C. § 1673b(a) (1993); see also American Lamb Co. v. United States, 785
F.2d 994, 1001 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (stating that the statute calls for a reasonable indication of
injury).
89 Section 771(7) (F) (i) of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended, 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7) (F) (i)
(1988), provides in relevant part:
In determining whether an industry in the United States is threatened with
material injury by reason of imports (or sales for importation) of the merchan-
dise, the Commission shall consider, among other relevant economic factors-
(I) If a subsidy is involved, such information as may be presented to it by
the administering authority as to the nature of the subsidy (particularly as to
whether the subsidy is an export subsidy inconsistent with the Agreement),
(II) any increase in production capacity or existing unused capacity in the
exporting country likely to result in a significant increase in imports of the
merchandise to the United States.
(III) any rapid increase in United States market penetration and the likeli-
hood that the penetration will increase to an injurious level,
(W) the probability that imports of the merchandise will enter the United
States at prices that will have a depressing or suppressing effect on domestic
prices of the merchandise,
(V) any substantial increase in inventories of the merchandise in the
United States,
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supplier makes a sale in the United States. Yet the threat of harm is
inherent in any competitive system, so the only logical way to eliminate
potential harm is to eliminate competition. The ITC need not deter-
mine whether imports are the sole, or even a principal or substantial
cause of material injury. All it must do is determine whether imports
are contributing minimally to a material injury.90
Another aspect of the concept of injury, or harm, that needs to be
discussed is that although a harm may be inflicted, it may be that no-
body's rights are violated.91 For example, if Joe wants to open a deli
across the street from Sam's Deli, Sam stands to be harmed, yet his
(VI) the presence of underutilized capacity for producing the merchandise
in the exporting country,
(VII) any other demonstrable adverse trends that indicate the probability
that the importation (or sale for importation) of the merchandise (whether or
not it is actually being imported at the time) will be the cause of actual injury,
(VIII) the potential for product-shifting if production facilities owned or con-
trolled by the foreign manufacturers, which can be used to produce products
subject to investigation(s) under section 1671 or 1673 of this title or to final
orders under section 1671e or 1673e of this title, are also used to produce the
merchandise under investigation,
(IX) in any investigation under this subtitle which involves imports of both
a raw agricultural product (within the meaning of paragraph (4) (E) (iv)) and
any product processed from such raw agricultural product, the likelihood that
there will be increased imports, by reason of product shifting, if there is an
affirmative determination by the Commission under section 1671(b)(1) or
1673(b) (1) of this title with respect to either the raw agricultural product or
the processed agricultural product (but not both)
(X) the actual and potential negative effects on the existing development
and production efforts of the domestic industry, including efforts to develop a
derivative or more advance version of the like product.
90 See, e.g., Metallverken Nederland v. United States, 13 Ct. Int'l Trade 471, 480 (1989)
(stating "[iut is sufficient that the imports contribute" minimally to the material injury); accord
Citrosuco Paulista, S.A. v. United States, 12 Ct. Int'l Trade 1196, 1228 (1988); see Hercules,
Inc. v. United States, 11 Ct. Int'l Trade 710, 74243 (1987); see also Maine Potato Council v.
United States, 9 Ct. Int'l Trade 293, 300-01 (1985) (stating that the Commission must reach
an affirmative determination if it finds that imports are more than a "de minimis" cause of
injury).
91 When looking at the rights aspect of antidumping legislation, one might ask the fol-
lowing question: If the antidumping laws grant a right to domestic producers, are not their
rights violated when a foreign producer engages in dumping? Therefore, is there not a con-
flict between the rights of domestic producers and the rights of foreign suppliers and Ameri-
can consumers? On the surface, this question might appear to be a legitimate one. But a
closer examination soon reveals that there is indeed no conflict of rights. The key to answer-
ing this question lies in clearly defining rights.
Rights are of two types: negative and positive. Examples include the rights to life, lib-
erty, and property, which when stated in negative terms, include the rights not to be killed,
not to be confined, and not to have your property taken without consent. These rights are
inherent-they do not come from government, but before it. Indeed, the reason for govern-
ment in the first place is to protect these negative rights, and any government that does not
protect them is failing in its duties.
Positive rights, on the other hand, are granted by the government. Examples include for
example the right to food, health care, and employment. The difference between negative
rights and positive rights is that negative rights cannot conflict with each other whereas posi-
tive rights can conflict. A negative rights regime is'a positive-sum regime because there are
no losers. But in a positive rights regime, there are both winners and losers. Positive rights
regimes are basically zero-sum games because for every winner there is a loser. Those who
have rights granted by government have them granted at the expense of someone else. In
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rights are not violated. Likewise, if a Korean company wants to sell
computer chips in the domestic American market, American chip sell-
ers might be harmed, although their rights are not necessarily violated.
Yet under current policies, the Commerce Department might punish
the Korean supplier anyway. If the purpose of government is to pro-
tect life, liberty, and property and otherwise leave people alone, such
an action by the Commerce Department, and the underlying statute
itself, seem inappropriate.
2. The "Public Interest"
Another philosophical problem, not only with the U.S. antidump-
ing policy, but with all antidumping policies, is the belief that laws re-
stricting dumping are somehow in the "public interest." But what,
exactly, is the public interest? Some commentators would argue that
there is no such thing. As Ayn Rand puts it:
Since there is no such entity as "the public," since the public is merely
a number of individuals, any claimed or implied conflict of the "public
interest" with private interests means that the interests of some men
are to be sacrificed to the interests and wishes of others. Since the
concept is so conveniently undefinable, its use rests only on any given
gang's ability to proclaim that "The public, c'est mo'-and to maintain
the claim at the point of a gun.9 2
John Hospers makes the following point:
People speak of "the public interest." But what is the public interest?
Strictly speaking, there is no such thing. There is only the interest of
each individual human being. There are interests that many or all
people share, but these are still the interests of individuals. When pol-
iticians say that something is "to the public interest," they usually
mean that it serves the interests of some people but goes .against the
interests of others-and usually the interests of the people with the
most political pull win out. Is it to the public interest for some to be
forced to die so that others may be saved? Is it to the public interest
order to be on the receiving end of a positive right, someone else's property rights may be
violated.
The antidumping law is an example of a positive rights regime. If government grants
domestic producers the right to punish foreign suppliers for selling products at prices that
are too low, they do so by violating the negative right of American consumers to obtain the
property they desire. They also violate the negative right of the foreign suppliers to trade
their property as they see fit. So the rights of the parties in question do not conflict from a
negative rights perspective because domestic producers have no negative right to prevent
American consumers (or users) and foreign suppliers from exchanging their property. Do-
mestic producers can prevent such transactions from taking place only if they use the force of
government to violate the negative rights of American consumers and foreign suppliers to
trade their property.
For a concise discussion on the difference between a negative rights and positive rights
regime, see Robert W. McGee, The ight to Not Associate: The Case for an Absolute Freedom of
Negative Association, 23 U. WEsr L.A.L. REv. 123, 136-38 (1992). For more detailed discus-
sions, see TIBOR MACHAN, INDIVIDUALS ANt THEIR RIGHTS (1989); ROBERT NoZICK, ANARCHv,
STATE AND UTOPIA (1974).
92 AYN RAND, THE VIRTUE OF SELS'SHNESS 88 (1961); THE AN RAND LEXICON: OBJECTrV-
isM FROM A TO Z 396 (Harry Binswanger ed. 1986).
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for a hundred crazed men to lynch one man in the public square? Is it
to the public interest for all the citizens of the nation to be taxed to
pay for a federal dam on one section of it? . .. Just as there are only
individual rights, so there are only individual interests.
9 3
Michael Novak questions whether a pluralist society can have a
common good.94 In the context of antidumping laws, it seems that the
interests of the domestic companies that stand to be harmed by for-
eign competition are being pitted against the interests of consumers,
who stand to pay lower prices if foreign companies are permitted to
sell their products in the domestic market. Thus, there is no common
interest, but conflicting interests.
3. The Concept of Fair Value
The Commerce Department determines "fair value" based on the
foreign exporter's home market prices, third country prices, or con-
structed value.95 The Korean chip manufacturers were accused of sell-
ing below fair value, implying that the Korean manufacturers' U.S.
price was unfair to competing U.S. producers. However, the argument
that the foreign exporter's U.S. price is unfair to competing producers
because the exporter sells bellow fair value is untenable.96 The foreign
producer's export price depends only on the demand curve it faces in
the U.S. market and marginal (delivered) cost, and not on the price
charged in the home market or in the third market, or the constructed
value. 97 Contending that the ultimate measure of the fairness of a
price to competing U.S. producers is the foreign manufacturer's home
market price or its price charged in the third counrty market, or con-
structed value, the calculation of which is "fraught with pitfalls,"98 is
unconvincing.99 For example, if the price charged in the U.S. is "un-
fair," can it be made fair by the exporter lowering the price in a sepa-
rate market such as Korea or Singapore?
A variation of this "selling below fair value" argument is the myth
that a firm can benefit by engaging in "predatory pricing."100 The
predatory pricing literature is fairly clear in its conclusion that preda-
tory pricing does not exist, because it is irrational behavior, or, if it
93 JOHN HOSPERS, LIBERTARIANISM: A POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY FOR ToMoRRoW 84 (1971).
94 MICHAEL NovAK, FREE PERSONS AND THE COMMON GOOD 19-22 (1989).
95 See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
96 Knoll, supra note 24.
97 Id.
98 Id. at 279.
99 Id. at 285.
100 Predatory pricing occurs when a firm temporarily reduces the price of its product to
drive competitors out of business. When the firm succeeds in establishing a monopoly posi-
tion, price is then raised commensurate with its market power. The new price level must be
sufficiently high to offset any losses that occurred during the period of low pricing. The firm
would presumably be confident in its ability to prevent the entry of potential competitors
long enough for it to obtain economic profits. ROBERTJ. CARBAUGH, INT'L ECON. 126 (1980).
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does exist, it has failed whenever it has been tried. 10 1 If a company did
manage to drive the competition out of business by selling below pro-
duction cost, it would lose money on every sale. Because its prices were
so low, it would gain market share, thus selling more units and driving
itself closer to bankruptcy. If it did attempt to raise its prices after the
competition had been decimated, new competitors would likely enter
the market to take advantage of the profit opportunities that come
with high prices, and in the long run prices would return to competi-
tive levels. Thus predatory pricing is irrational, self-defeating behavior.
Furthermore, even if predatory pricing did exist, it is questionable
whether the practice should be prohibited because there are no identi-
fiable "victims."1 0 2 Although some companies might be driven out of
business by the practice, consumers benefit from the lower prices. The
competitors that are driven out of business lose sales because consum-
ers vote with their dollars to give their business to someone else, so no
"rights" 10 3 are violated by the practice. The basic right in a market
economy is to outsell and outdo competition, not to be protected from
competition.
4. The Utilitarian Approach
Economists tend to be utilitarians, meaning that they base their
determinations on whether a policy is good or bad on whether the
good outweighs the bad.104 One might say that they aim at policies
that produce the greatest amount of good for the greatest number.
But there are several drawbacks to this approach. For one thing, there
is no way to accurately measure precisely how much is gained or lost by
a particular policy. Domestic chip makers gain something if foreign
suppliers are assessed a dumping tariff, and foreign suppliers lose
something, but that is an incomplete picture. There are secondary ef-
fects that are more difficult to quantify. For example, antidumping
tariffs also have an adverse effect on companies that use products con-
taining computer chips because they have to pay higher prices to ob-
tain such products. These companies must either pass on these costs
to their customers in the form of higher prices or absorb the added
cost in their bottom line. Higher costs have a drag on growth, which in
turn has an adverse effect on competitiveness and employment growth.
Thus, although assessing antidumping duties helps some groups and
101 See Ronald H. Koller, The Myth of Predatory Pricing: An Empirical Study, 4 ANTITRUST L.
& ECON. REV. 105, 105-23 (1971); John S. McGee, Predatory Price Cutting: The Standard Oil
(N.J.) Case, 1 J.L. & EcoN. 137, 137-69 (1968). There are no known cases where any company
has dropped its prices so low as to drive the competition out of business, then raised its prices
over an extended period of time. See BovARD, supra note 40, at 157.
102 Franklin M. Fisher, On Predation and Victimless Crime, 32 ANTITRUST BULL. 85, 85-92
(1987).
103 See supra note 90.
104 MURRAY N. ROTHBARD, MAN, ECONOMY AND STATE: A TREATISE ON ECONOMIC PRINCI-
PLES 260-68 (1970).
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harms other groups, it is not easy to determine what the total gains and
losses are, or whether the total gains exceed the total losses.
But perhaps the major drawback of using a utilitarian approach is
that the adverse effect on individual rights is totally ignored. In a utili-
tarian-based approach, it is not even an issue whether someone's rights
are violated by a policy of assessing an antidumping charge. Yet the
possibility that a particular policy might violate property or contract
rights is a very serious question, one that should not be ignored. And a
policy that levies tariffs against foreign suppliers that sell their products
to willing buyers without violating the rights of third parties (such as
domestic producers) violates both the rights of the American firms
that purchase from the foreign suppliers and the rights of American
consumers. All antidumping duties force consumers to pay higher
prices for products, thus depriving them of property (cash), and the
foreign sellers have their rights infringed upon because antidumping
policies make it more difficult to enter into contracts in the first place,
which unnecessarily infringes on their right to contract. Any approach
that ignores this aspect of the issue, as does the utilitarian approach, is
questionable.
IV. Unjustly Accused of Violating an Unjust Law?
Could it be said that domestic producers that stand to be harmed
by competition from foreign producers are victims? No. There is a
crucial difference between being harmed by some activity and being a
victim. While domestic producers stand to be harmed by competition,
they are not victims, because being a victim involves having one's rights
violated.10 5 In a free enterprise economy, it is illogical to say one has a
"right" to be protected from competition, and harm that results from
loss of sales to a competitor does not constitute the violation of a viable
right.
Ideally, statutes follow and support the rights of individuals in a
given society. In the case of antidumping law, outdated (and harmful)
statutes have been appropriated, interpreted, and extrapolated to sug-
gest a "right" (i.e., protection from foreign competition) that is anti-
thetical to a free enterprise economic system.
Domestic producers have no inherent claim on the funds of
American consumers. The only ethical way that domestic producers
can obtain the funds of American consumers is through voluntary
trade. Using the force of the government to obtain the funds (by
prohibiting foreign suppliers from competiting) puts domestic produ-
cers in the role of the aggressor, and makes American consumers, in
fact, the real victims. That is exactly what happens when a domestic
producer appeals to the government to request an antidumping inves-
105 See supra note 91 (discussing rights).
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tigation against some foreign producer that is merely taking business
away.
From the evidence, it is questionable whether Korean chipmakers
have ever violated the existing statute in most cases. If domestic produ-
cers are losing sales, it is because domestic users of the products and
ultimately consumers are willing to give foreign producers the busi-
ness. Hence, not only are Korean (foreign) companies faced with un-
just accusations, but they are also faced with an unjust law, which in the
end, does the greatest harm to American consumers.
